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“In what was to have been the future. . . .” 
— Thien (3)
ith this introduction to her novel Certainty, Madeleine 
Thien puts her reader into an uncertain position: how can 
the reader grasp the temporality of a narrative that opens 
with the future perfect situated in the past tense? Throughout her novel, 
Thien troubles a progressive concept of temporality, a troubling that 
is mediated not simply through standard narrative devices like f lash-
backs, but through a continuous repetition and revisiting of events and 
images. The past is not simply represented as anterior, then, as a time 
or event to which the narrative may shift back; rather, the past repeats 
in the present and, as such, is also constantly imminent, about to arrive. 
Thien’s concern with time becomes significant not only in its troubling 
of a progressive, teleological narrative, but also in its engagement with 
trauma and loss. I argue that in Certainty, Thien proposes a restruc-
turing of how we conceptualize trauma and loss in time, suggesting 
a reproductive potential in the continued engagement with loss. This 
potential for reproduction resides in the repetition of loss and trauma 
in time, through the subject’s repeated and transformative engagement 
with loss.
In a review of the development of theories of loss and melancholia, 
Judith Butler notes that “the presumptions that the future follows the 
past, that mourning might follow melancholia, that mourning might be 
completed” have all been “poignantly called into question” (467). For 
Butler, the troubling of these presumptions is a product of the paradox-
ical temporality of loss, as loss reveals that “the past is irrecoverable and 
the past is not past; the past is the resource for the future and the future 
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is the redemption of the past” (467). Yet, we must ask ourselves what 
this disruption of a teleology of loss achieves. If loss is not past, and if 
mourning does not necessarily follow loss, then where does the subject 
of loss stand in relation to the lost object? This line of enquiry intersects 
with contemporary discussions of loss and melancholia at two points: 
first, with theories of melancholic subjectivity and identity formation, 
and second, with the theorization of political agency around a shared 
or communal loss. I propose that a discussion of the temporality of loss, 
and of Thien’s specific treatment of time and loss in Certainty, offers 
a framework by which to imagine the productive potential of multiple 
forms of loss, both for individuals and communities.
In an article addressing the temporality of loss, Lily Cho identifies 
what she terms the “polarization” (434) of theories of loss and mel-
ancholia. This polarization arises from Freud’s distinction between 
“healthy” mourning and “pathological” melancholia, but this dis-
tinction also marks a temporal divide. Freud asserts that mourning 
constitutes the “withdrawal of the libido” from the lost object and a 
“displacement of it on to a new one” (249). “Healthy” mourning thus 
constitutes the reinvestment of the ego in a new object. Melancholia, on 
the other hand, occurs when reinvestment in a new object does not take 
place; instead, the lost object is internalized or introjected and becomes 
the foundation for “an identification of the ego with the abandoned 
object” (249). In other words, “pathological” melancholia constitutes an 
“unhealthy” inability to get over the past. Cho specifically challenges 
the ontological division between “healthy” mourning and “unhealthy” 
melancholia in regards to racial melancholia, and while Thien does 
not specifically refer to race in her novel — she gives no phenotypical 
descriptions of her characters, for example, and it takes careful read-
ing of family names and family genealogies to apprehend what might 
be termed a character’s race or ethnicity — the losses of the racialized 
subject are yet of vital importance to the text. Certainty is structured 
around the loss of a partner and daughter; however, this supposedly 
private death — the death of a cherished family member — intersects 
with multiple and differing experiences of loss that cross geopolitical 
boundaries and what otherwise might appear to be discrete subject pos-
itions. In fact, much of the loss, trauma, and pain at work in Thien’s 
novel is connected to the post-WW II period of decolonization in Asia 
and Africa. Gail’s father, Matthew, for example, witnesses the execution-
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style killing of his father by Japanese occupying forces in North Borneo; 
Kathleen, a woman Gail interviews, is tied to her father’s traumatic 
experiences in a prisoner-of-war camp; and Sipke, whom Gail knows as 
the partner of her father’s first love, struggles with the horrifying scenes 
he has witnessed as a photojournalist in states experiencing the violent 
turmoil of independence movements in Indochina, then Algeria, South 
Africa, and Indonesia (230). Thien’s engagement with the violence of 
decolonization in her novel thus marks an engagement with the racism 
of imperialisms — English, French, Dutch, and Japanese — and their 
fallouts. 
Applied to the melancholic subjects of Thien’s text, the diagnos-
tic classification of a “healthy” or “unhealthy” response to loss, there-
fore, becomes highly problematic in its pathologization of subjectivities 
bound to the losses imposed by the racisms of a colonial past and their 
continued articulation in a post-colonial order. It is imperative, then, 
to challenge the positioning of melancholia as pathological, for, in so 
doing, we can challenge a construction of the racialized subject as ill, 
debilitated, or abnormal. Anne Anlin Cheng has worked to depatholo-
gize melancholia in her work on the losses of the racialized subject in 
an exploration of the potential for an agential engagement with loss. 
In “The Melancholy of Race,” Cheng successfully moves a discussion 
of the racialized other as the lost object of white normativity to the 
melancholic subject who can transition from “being a subject of grief” 
to a subject of what Cheng terms “grievance” (3).1 In so doing, Cheng 
recognizes the agency of the racial melancholic, yet this agency does not 
translate necessarily or inevitably into productivity, but rather into the 
potential for productivity and political activism. In their introduction 
to Loss: The Politics of Mourning, David Eng and David Kazanjian chal-
lenge the pathologization of melancholia by returning to Freud’s own 
problematization of his distinction between “healthy” mourning and 
“unhealthy” melancholia. Eng and Kazanjian point to Freud’s recogni-
tion of the role of the internalization of a lost object in the formation of 
the ego; they thus successfully highlight the productive role of the mel-
ancholic response to loss in identity formation (4). Eng and Kazanjian 
go on to argue that melancholia further becomes “the precondition for 
both the ego and the work of mourning” (4). Consequently, we come 
to see that a discrete semantic division cannot be maintained between 
pathological melancholia and healthy mourning; rather, the two appear 
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contiguous. What is more, in “A Dialogue on Racial Melancholia,” Eng 
and Shinhee Han challenge Freud’s configuration of melancholia as a 
“one-person” pathology and argue that the refusal or inability to “‘get 
over’ the lost ideal of whiteness . . . is less individual than social” (345). I 
wish to emphasize here that work to depathologize melancholia does not 
signify that melancholic subjectivity is necessarily productive, nor does 
it attempt to elide the very real and negative effects of melancholia. Eng 
and Han affirm, for example, that “the depression often accompanying 
melancholia is extremely dangerous, characterized by the tendency to 
suicide,” and add that this suicide “may not be merely physical; it may 
also be a psychical erasure of one’s identity — racial, sexual or gender 
identity ” (346). I emphasize, then, that melancholia is neither necessar-
ily pathological nor inevitably productive; instead, I wish to stress that 
efforts to depathologize melancholia allow for the potential for produc-
tivity in the valorization of melancholic subjectivity and the movement 
toward claiming social and political agency. 
Such attempts to depathologize melancholia, however, tend to write 
melancholic losses in the past. While the depathologization of melan-
cholia offers “a way to valorize the incurability of certain griefs” (Cho 
428) and further suggests the potential for the political mobilization of 
such griefs, it relies on a configuration of loss as “that which has to have 
already happened” (Cho 427). To put it another way, efforts to mobil-
ize melancholia rest on a configuration of loss in the past perfect. This 
is problematic for two reasons. First, as Cho puts it, posing loss as “an 
‘inheritance’ risks taking for granted the ‘subjective states’ which may 
still be in process” (427). That is to say that situating loss in the past 
perfect limits the formation of subjectivity to a completed and inescap-
able cause, and would appear to likewise limit the agency of the subject. 
Second, and perhaps more significantly, denying a continued negotia-
tion of loss and melancholia glosses over precisely how the melancholic 
subject or community can move from “grief” to “grievance.” If the past 
is not past, and mourning does not necessarily follow loss, how does 
“grievance” come to follow “grief”? 
This disruption of a teleology of loss calls to mind Benjamin’s con-
ceptualization of history and progress in his “Theses on the Philosophy 
of History.” Benjamin’s image of the angel of history, “his face . . . 
turned toward the past” (259) as the storm of progress “irresistibly pro-
pels him into the future to which his back is turned” (260), mirrors 
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the problematic positioning of a subject in relation to losses anchored 
in the past. If the storm of “what we call progress” (260) ceases, or if 
the losses of history are cleaved from the teleology of progressive time, 
to what direction does the angel of history, or the melancholic subject, 
turn? For Benjamin, the end of a progressive view of history translates 
into a redemptive vision of the past. The arrest of teleology is productive 
or even reproductive, as it is “pregnant with tensions” (264; emphasis 
added). Benjamin’s concept of the “time of the now” (265) is therefore 
not simply a valorization of the present; rather, it communicates a preg-
nant present, a present imbued with immanence, “shot through with 
chips of Messianic time” (265). One must then not so much turn to 
the past, but rather bring the past to bear on the present. As Eng and 
Kazanjian observe, “According to Benjamin, to mourn the remains of 
the past hopefully . . . is a creative process, animating history for future 
significations as well as alternate emphathies” (1; emphasis added). 
Similarly, Butler notes that loss is “oddly fecund, paradoxically product-
ive” (468). I assert that the paradoxical productivity of loss arises from 
its paradoxical temporality, where past losses move from a teleological 
history to a continued presence. 
In Certainty, loss comes to inhabit the present, not simply as a 
spectre of the past but as an “oddly fecund” immanence. Thien does 
not represent past losses as those that have already happened, nor does 
she simply suggest that the effects of a past loss extend progressively 
from the past into the present. Rather, loss inhabits the present of the 
text, even while its event occurred in the past. As mentioned in the 
opening of this essay, the novel opens in an uncertain temporality. The 
first paragraph of the novel recounts a lost future, or a lost potential, 
with Ansel waking to the presence of his lost partner: 
In what was to have been the future, Ansel rolled towards her, half 
awake, half forgetful. He curved his body around hers and Gail’s 
warmth drew him back into sleep. Morning passed into afternoon, 
the rest of the world waited outside, but he and Gail were just rising 
from bed, they were fumbling into their clothes, they knew that 
the day was long. (3)
Gail haunts Ansel as an absent presence; at a dinner falling on the six-
month anniversary of her death, an “empty chair and place setting, 
intended for spirits departed, is to Ansel’s right” (9). For Ansel, Gail’s 
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absence is also active: “Gail is here beside him, laughing in delight at the 
spread of food. She hoists the wine bottle to make sure that every glass 
is full” (11). Ansel is further able to continue to call up her presence, or 
her voice, as he listens to her radio documentaries. Loss in Certainty, 
then, persists; what is more, it repeats throughout the novel, imbu-
ing the text with a sense of imminent loss. While the novel opens six 
months after Gail’s death, the structure of the text configures her loss 
as either present, as in the above examples, or about to arrive. Ansel’s 
memories of her death and the conditions surrounding it unfold as the 
narrative develops, and as a result, the reader is placed in a position 
of constant anticipation. In the first chapter, enigmatic intimations of 
her death appear in the mention of Ansel and Gail’s last conversation, 
“a telephone call, long distance” (7), and in Clara’s memories of her 
daughter intersecting with a fragmentary reference to “Prince George, 
the hotel room, the suitcases of clothes all disintegrating” (17). By the 
third chapter, Gail’s loss remains on the horizon, although it appears a 
little more clearly, as Ansel recalls the onset of Gail’s illness while work-
ing in Prince George (86-87). The loss of Gail becomes both “a loss that 
is spread out over time, bits and pieces that break down and gradually 
disintegrate” (87) and a loss that is arriving, that is undergoing a process 
of reconstruction or reproduction.
This negotiation of both the immanence and imminence of loss 
— of its ongoing presence in the present and of its arrival or return in 
the future — becomes a creative, or reproductive, process in Thien’s 
novel. Gail’s death is not the only loss present in the text, however. 
Rather, Certainty is a novel that tracks multiple losses and sites of 
trauma, including the losses of multiple generations. While these forms 
of loss and trauma are certainly not commensurate, and while the char-
acters of the text respond to these losses differently, in each instance 
loss repeats in the text and consequently appears both as present and as 
that which is always about to arrive. One way in which loss is config-
ured as both immanent and imminent in the novel is in the repetition 
of loss and trauma from generation to generation. Marianne Hirsch’s 
concept of “postmemory” as a form of memory that is mediated through 
“an imaginative investment and creation” (22) is useful here. Hirsch 
defines postmemory as “the experience of those who grow up dominated 
by narratives that preceded their birth, whose own belated stories are 
evacuated by the stories of the previous generation shaped by traumatic 
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events” (22). Hirsch thus distinguishes between memory as that of the 
survivor and postmemory as that of the child of survivors (21-22). The 
concept of postmemory is significant not only in its identification of 
the effects of trauma and loss on subsequent generations, but also in its 
recognition that these effects do not necessarily stem directly from the 
past. Hirsch explains, “I propose the term ‘postmemory’ with some hesi-
tation, conscious that the prefix ‘post’ could imply that we are beyond 
memory and therefore perhaps . . . purely in history” (22). Postmemory 
is not simply an effect or descendent of its antecedent losses; rather, 
postmemory is an active engagement with a narrative of loss, or even 
with the absence of a narrative of loss. The process of “imaginative 
investment and creation” that postmemory entails, then, is not one of 
looking back to recall a lost object, but rather a productive engagement 
with loss in the present. 
In Certainty, we can recognize a number of characters that must act-
ively engage with narratives of loss of a previous generation. Kathleen, 
the daughter of a survivor of a POW camp, must mediate postmemory. 
Kathleen’s childhood was dominated by a narrative of trauma that pre-
ceded her birth or, more accurately, by a narrative that was not told, 
that cannot be told, as her father cannot break the code that encrypts 
his journal from that time. Gail, likewise, grows up dominated by a 
narrative of trauma and loss that preceded her birth. Again, she medi-
ates a narrative that is not told, that in this instance is wilfully with-
held. Matthew, Gail’s father, never reveals the details of his past to 
his daughter. Yet, a narrative of trauma and loss is still communicated 
through silence, evidenced by the “list of eccentricities” that Gail once 
kept about her father (206). These eccentricities, although not vocal-
ized, speak to his experiences during and directly after the Japanese 
occupation of North Borneo. Gail explains that her father is an insom-
niac whose insomnia sometimes slides “into depression” (206). The list 
goes on: “Her father was afraid of the dark. He could not eat certain 
foods: sweet potato, cassava and tapioca, which he called ubi kayu. . . . 
He had a fascination with Japan, a quick temper” (206-07). For Gail, 
then, her father’s experiences of trauma and loss are not isolated in the 
past. Instead, the manifestations of that past trauma inhabit the present. 
What is more, while she never hears the totality of her father’s story, she 
turns to the testimony of others in her work — work that entails both a 
listening and an aesthetically productive response to loss. Gail’s work as 
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a radio producer and documentarist thus marks a creative engagement 
with memory and loss.
The generative potential in the disruption of a teleology of loss 
becomes clearer with an analysis of the creative mediation of trauma and 
loss in Gail’s work. In Certainty, characters mediate different forms of 
loss differently. On the one hand, recollection of trauma in the novel is 
a function of memory, and Thien’s characters deploy differing strategies 
for mediating memories of trauma and loss. Matthew is largely silent, 
depressive, and melancholic; William Sullivan records his experiences 
in a POW camp in Hong Kong in a journal but does so in a code he 
himself cannot break; and Clara commemorates her daughter by visit-
ing her grave. Yet Thien also introduces the recollection of trauma as a 
function of collecting, an archival recollecting of the traces of trauma, 
both in the form of photographs and recorded testimonies. These forms 
of recollection, though, are not commensurate. Rather, as Pilar Cuder-
Dominguez suggests in her paper on representations of the artist in the 
novel, Thien privileges Gail’s artistic production as a radio producer 
over Sipke’s work as a war photographer.2 Cuder-Dominguez argues 
that this privileging is a question of the ethics of the representation of 
trauma, pointing to the photograph as a mode of representation that 
is decontextualized and thus open to dangerous (mis)interpretations. 
According to Cuder-Dominguez, Certainty becomes a “critique of the 
visible” (12). I assert that the privileging of the aural over the visual in 
Thien’s novel is not only a matter of the ethics of art, but also a question 
of how we locate trauma in time. In Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, 
Narrative and History, Cathy Caruth turns to the Greek etymology of 
the word to define trauma as a wound but is careful to note that a trau-
matic event does not simply constitute a wounding; instead, she empha-
sizes that trauma “is not just any event but, significantly, the shock-
ing and unexpected occurrence of an accident” (6). Her definition of 
trauma as a form of accident is significant in that the subject of trauma 
experiences an element of fright, or “the lack of preparedness to take in 
stimulus that comes too quickly” (62). It is this “lack of preparedness” 
that leads to an inevitable return of trauma, as the traumatic event “is 
not fully perceived as it occurs” (18). Trauma thus becomes “latent” (17) 
or “belated” (7), as the subject of trauma must revisit that which was 
not seen, what one was not prepared to see. As Caruth explains, “What 
returns to haunt the victim . . . is not only the reality of the violent 
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event but also the reality of the way that violence has not yet been fully 
known” (6). The subject of trauma, or of traumatic loss, then, will not 
experience trauma as a known memory of a past event, but will instead 
experience trauma as a latent event, repeating in time.
Visual representations of trauma in Certainty, consequently, become 
problematic not simply in their lack of ethical context, but also in their 
tendency to fix trauma in the past. As a war photographer, Sipke is 
praised for his ability to “catch and distinguish the defining moment” 
in his photos (229). When he describes the last photo he took as a war 
photographer, a photo of a traumatic event that forced him to abandon 
his work, he explains, 
It’s the last good photograph I have taken, but I can’t bear to look 
at it. I keep asking myself, what happens when the context is lost 
and only the image remains? People look at that picture now, in 
magazines and books, and they speculate about it. They don’t know 
what happened before or after. All they see is this one moment, 
disconnected from the past or the future. (245-46)
Sipke is clearly anxious here about the isolation of the traumatic event 
from its context, an isolation that “feeds [the viewer’s] imagination” and 
leads to “speculation” (246). The photograph becomes the object of a 
voyeuristic consumption and is further open to misinterpretation and 
manipulation. While Cuder-Dominguez focuses on the danger of specu-
lation that Sipke’s photograph feeds, I wish to draw attention to Thien’s 
identification of the photograph as “one moment, disconnected from 
the past or the future” (246). Sipke’s photograph removes the traumatic 
event not only from its political and human contexts, but also from its 
continued presence in time.
This decontextualization of trauma that Sipke’s work performs 
becomes an essentially violent act in Certainty. We learn that Sipke, as 
a war photographer, “tried to follow Robert Capa’s famous dictum: ‘If 
your pictures aren’t good enough, you aren’t close enough’” (229). The 
imperative to get as close as possible to the subject of the photograph, 
to the point where the photographer becomes a part of the scene, where 
“his body dissolv[es] into the scene around him” (Thien 229), bespeaks 
the realist assumption that lies behind Sipke’s photojournalism. This 
assumption of realism is best delineated by Roland Barthes, who argues 
that a “specific photograph . . . is never distinguished from its refer-
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ent” (5). According to Barthes, “The Photograph is never anything but 
an antiphon of ‘Look,’ ‘See,’ ‘Here it is’ . . . and cannot escape this 
pure deictic language” (5). Yet the realist notion that photography is an 
essentially deictic or referential mode of representation overlooks the 
codes that inform the processes of selection and production involved in 
photography. Allan Sekula points to the fallacy of the conception of the 
photograph as referential or evidential, suggesting that “within the dom-
inant culture of photography, we find a chain of dodges and denials: 
at any stage of photographic production, the apparatus of selection and 
interpretation is liable to render itself invisible (or conversely to celebrate 
its own workings as a kind of moral crusade or creative magic)” (446). 
Sipke’s work as a war photographer is problematic precisely because it 
performs such “dodges and denials.” Sipke sees himself both as invis-
ible, with “his body dissolving” into the scenes that he photographs, 
and as a deliverer of a truth. To Sipke, “The photograph is revealing, it 
triggers something that you know, a truth that you haven’t yet found a 
way to express” (Thien 238). This view of the photographer as a passive 
medium of reality or the “truths” of reality functions to deny the codes 
that inform the photographer’s gaze and the contexts that place the pho-
tographer at a scene; in other words, the codes and contexts that inform 
and construct such “truths.” Sipke’s growing unease with his work, then, 
reflects a growing unease with the realist, revelatory culture of photog-
raphy. In Sipke’s discomfort, we can recognize Susan Sontag’s image 
of the photographer as “the diligent hunter-with-a-camera” who views 
reality “as an exotic prize to be tracked down” (54-55). For Sontag, the 
realist project of photography becomes a predatory project of hunting, 
scavenging and consumption: “For more than a century, photograph-
ers have been hovering about the oppressed, in attendance at scenes 
of violence, . . . in order to document a hidden reality, that is, a real-
ity hidden from them” (55). Sipke’s sense of shame over his photos of 
“the mutilated bodies of men and women who had been tortured and 
killed,” of “two small children, crawling through the bombed wreckage 
of their home,” of “a dead child abandoned in a field” (230) speaks to a 
questioning of his role as an ostensibly transparent, objective observer 
and medium of reality. 
The referential mask of photography allows for the possibility of 
the performance of a different type of violence in Certainty. In a realist 
construction of photography, the photographer does not merely pose as 
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an objective lens that elides a project to hunt and consume the photo-
graphic object; rather, the realist presumption of referentiality further 
functions to seize the photographic object as an object of an eternal, 
immutable past. Barthes points to this violent seizure in his recogni-
tion of the “immobilization” (91) of time in photography. According 
to Barthes, “when we define the Photograph as a motionless image, 
this does not mean only that the figures it represents do not move; it 
means that they do not emerge, do not leave: they are anaesthetized and 
fastened down” (57). Put differently, photographic subjects are frozen 
in an eternal past, unable physically to move forward in time. Since the 
subjects of Sipke’s photographs are traumatic events, his photography 
runs the risk of rendering trauma eternal, and thus of representing the 
shock and horror of trauma without mediation. As a result, the seiz-
ure of traumatic moments in Sipke’s work potentially renders viewers 
of his photographs victims of a visual violence. To return to Caruth’s 
definition of trauma as an accident for which the subject is unprepared, 
Sipke’s war photography carries the potential not simply to represent 
trauma but also to re-inflict it on unprepared viewers. Barthes discusses 
the affective qualities of certain photographs as a form of punctuation, 
as that which will “wound” or “prick” like a “pointed instrument” (26). 
Significantly, this wounding or pricking is triggered by the unexpected, 
and is accordingly defined by Barthes as “that accident that pricks me” 
(27; emphasis added). The referential images of trauma that Sipke pro-
duces, then, become potential sites of a re-wounding, thereby repeating 
trauma without transforming it.
The stillness, or stilling of time, that a photograph performs thus 
potentially renders the photograph violent, a violence that Barthes iden-
tifies, “not because it shows violent things, but because on each occa-
sion it fills the sight by force, and because in it nothing can be refused 
or transformed” (91). In effect, this violent stilling or seizure of time in 
photography functions to render the photographic subject monumental. 
As photography seizes its subject as a monumental image of the past, 
the photograph becomes a melancholic object to which the melancholic 
subject must eternally turn back. As Barthes explains in a comparison 
with film, “the Photograph . . . is without future . . . ; in it, no protensity, 
whereas the cinema is protensive, hence in no way melancholic” (90). 
The stillness of the photograph functions to deaden its subject, to freeze 
that subject in an eternal, monumental moment of time from which 
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there is no possibility of future movement, transformation, or produc-
tion. This seizure of time becomes much like Benjamin’s identification 
of a concept of a “homogenous, empty time” that the concept of histor-
ical progress requires (263). The subject of the photograph is deadened 
in an empty time of progress and becomes eternally past. As such, the 
photograph comes to perform loss — it situates its objects irretrievably 
in the past, without future — and in Certainty, Sipke’s photography per-
forms loss as irrecoverably past, as that which has already happened. The 
anxiety surrounding Sipke’s war photography in Certainty thus becomes 
an anxiety over how loss is situated in time. Photographs become melan-
cholic objects anchored in an eternal past, or what Sontag terms “instant 
antiques” (80), to which melancholic subjects will always be turned, 
propelled with their backs to the future.
Gail’s work as a radio documentarist, in contrast, opens up a space 
for future generative possibilities in its negotiation of trauma and loss in 
time. To help distinguish the different temporalities at work in Sipke’s 
photography and Gail’s documentaries, I turn to Dori Laub’s theory 
of testimony. Like Caruth, Laub recognizes that a traumatic event is 
unseen or unknowable in its occurrence: 
Massive trauma precludes its registration; the observing and record-
ing mechanisms of the human mind are temporarily knocked out, 
malfunction. The victim’s narrative — the very process of bear-
ing witness to massive trauma — does indeed begin with someone 
who testifies to an absence, to an event that has not yet come into 
existence. (57)
Significantly, Laub emphasizes the need to communicate absence in 
the act of bearing witness to trauma. Sipke’s war photography functions 
more as evidential or historical document than as productive testimony. 
As Laub explains, “While historical evidence to the event which con-
stitutes the trauma may be abundant and documents in vast supply, the 
trauma — as known event and not simply as an overwhelming shock 
— has not been truly witnessed yet” (57). As historical documents, 
Sipke’s photos place trauma in the past. While this may function to 
communicate the shock of trauma, it does not lead to an engagement 
with the unknowability of trauma and the violence that precipitates it. 
Gail’s work as a documentarist, however, allows for a testimony to 
absent or unseen losses and thus positions loss as that which is about 
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to arrive, latent, and in-formation in the very process of giving testi-
mony. When describing the reels and reels of interviews that she refuses 
to throw away, Gail compares testifying about loss to finding a lost 
box: “You know that feeling when you’re moving house, going through 
boxes, and you find something unexpected? That’s what I feel is hap-
pening to them. Inside their minds, they open the box, and there it is 
right in front of them, almost as if they’re seeing it for the first time” 
(84-85). The act of testifying, then, does not constitute the retelling 
of a past event; rather, it represents a construction of a narrative of a 
trauma or loss that arrives or is discovered, as if for the first time, in its 
active telling. Laub clarifies that “knowledge in the testimony is . . . not 
simply a factual given that is reproduced and replicated by the testifier, 
but a genuine advent, an event in its own right” (62). It is the advent 
of loss that allows for a productive potential to emerge in and through 
loss; Laub emphasizes the creative process involved in testimony as the 
space where the “‘knowing’ of an event is given birth to,” marking “the 
creation of knowledge de novo” (57). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the conceptualization of loss 
as that which is about to arrive allows the subject of loss to negotiate his 
or her engagement with its futurity — with how he or she will tell, nar-
rate, and mobilize that loss in the future. To return to Cho’s discussion 
of the temporality of loss, a distinction must be made here between the 
prophecy of loss and the imminence of loss. Cho writes, “Feeling loss 
proleptically [as that which is imminent] is crucially different from feel-
ing it as a prophecy. It is precisely the unknowability of loss’s prolepsis 
that is important here. Prophecies predict certain futures. Prolepsis is 
predictive but uncertain; it lies on the edges of possibility” (434). The 
configuration of loss as imminent, thus, produces the potential for an 
active and agential engagement with loss. Gail’s work in Certainty as a 
radio documentarist engages with the prolepsis of loss; unlike Sipke’s 
photographs, which isolate loss in the past, Gail’s documentaries situate 
loss as unfolding along with the testimony of the subjects she interviews. 
The process of testimony that Gail, as listener, facilitates allows these 
subjects to construct their losses actively and to negotiate their grief, a 
form of agency that extends even to the withholding of testimony. One 
woman, for example, whose son drowned in an accident, becomes sud-
denly angry with Gail’s questions. It is not the telling of her loss that 
appears to bother the woman, but its recording; as she explains, “words 
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that I put in the world can never be taken back” (210). The woman 
takes action, then, and Gail remembers the incident as, indeed, a series 
of actions: “frantic gestures, the ribbon pulled out of the cassette, spool-
ing onto the ground” (210). 
The documenting of loss that Gail performs in the text is thus sub-
ject to ethical risks similar to that of photography — the recording of 
words that “can never be taken back” is suggestive of the potential to 
freeze loss irrevocably in an unchanging historical record. However, 
Gail, as both listener and producer, takes on a productive and, indeed, 
reproductive role in the negotiation of loss. As a listener to the testimony 
of others, Gail becomes part of the productive process of knowing loss, 
as witnesses negotiate and construct loss and trauma de novo as if “seeing 
it for the first time.” Indeed, her role as listener makes such testimony 
possible. Her production of documentaries around these testimonies 
further extends this creative process as she literally shifts from listener to 
producer. In the role of producer, Gail labours toward a generative repro-
duction of loss. We learn that she “works with the belief that histories 
touch” (209); she thus works to reproduce histories of loss in a weaving 
together of interviews, testimony, music, and sound “in the hope that 
stories will not be lost in the chaos of never touching one another, never 
overlapping in any true way” (210). While Sipke’s photographs isolate 
traumas in a linear conception of history, Gail’s radio documentaries 
work to bring narratives of trauma into generative spaces of potential 
reproduction. Moreover, Gail’s work with testimony remains sensitive 
to its timing. Gail is devoted to her archive of tape and testimony: “She 
collects tape the way others collect rare books, safeguarding them with 
a feeling of reverence” (195). However, Gail’s “devotion” lies not in the 
collection itself, or in the archival record it provides, or in any sense of 
historical accuracy to which it might be presumed to speak. Instead, we 
learn that “for Gail, the devotion lies in more than the words spoken. 
It is in the words spoken at a specific moment in time, in a particular 
place. A child singing in the background, a pause in the telling, an old 
woman wetting her lips, smoothing her dress. A man who forgets the 
presence of the microphone, who begins a conversation with himself” 
(195). What remains of importance, then, in Gail’s work — as well as in 
the grief work the novel itself performs, in its depiction and construction 
of multiple forms of loss — is the refusal to relegate loss and any of its 
productive “grievances” to the past.
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For Gail, it is imperative to recognize the place of past lost in the 
present, to recognize the moment of its telling in time, even as that tell-
ing gestures to a time now past. The novel is structured in such a way as 
to perform this timely mediation of loss. As mentioned above, the loss 
of Gail unfolds with the plot of the novel; indeed, it inhabits multiple 
temporalities. Her death, a past event, is recognized in the present of 
the text and yet is always arriving in its future, or in its telling. The 
same can be said for the other losses recounted in the text: the death 
of Matthew’s father and the trauma surrounding the Japanese occupa-
tion of Borneo occur in the past, haunt the present, and loom on the 
horizon of the novel’s future; the loss of Sipke’s wife, Ani, to cancer, 
likewise shares this uncertain temporality; and, finally, one loss resides 
only in its imminence — the death of Al, suffering from HIV-AIDS, 
is expected with the close of the novel, his loss already felt by his sister. 
Indeed, in the midst of the scene detailing the discussion of his progno-
sis between Al, his doctor, and his sister, the text interrupts itself; inter-
jected between exchanges in a dialogue, we learn that “outside, in the 
hallway, time continues. They can hear the voices of nurses, of visitors 
in a nearby room” (299). Throughout the novel, aural and visual cues 
remind the reader that the losses represented in the text are situated in 
a present that is passing, and a future that is arriving. Again and again, 
the narrative interrupts itself with seemingly insignificant asides, with 
“a group of school children . . . laughing down the sidewalk, two by 
two, holding hands” (202) as Gail sits down to work one day; with “a 
woman call[ing] out, then a screen door open[ing] and slowly clos[ing], 
the hinges creaking” (210) as she writes an email; with Clara imagining 
the image of her husband “rising from bed, standing at the curtains, 
gazing out at this starlit night” when, from “across the hall, she can hear 
the floorboards creaking” (16). Each of these cues, often aural, remind 
the reader of Gail’s devotion not to the words of a story, or to their 
ostensible referentiality, but to their utterance in “a specific moment 
in time, in a particular place” (195). Certainty, thereby, becomes a text 
whose narrative structure performs loss, wherein the representation and 
reconstruction of loss becomes constitutive not only of a past, fixed 
record, but also of a changing present, the recognition of which allows 
for the potential to mobilize these narratives beyond the isolation of 
singular losses, to avoid the “chaos of never touching.”
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In configuring loss as imminent, Thien effectively clears a temporal 
space where the subject of grief can grapple with an inevitable and yet 
unknown or unknowable loss. The subject of grief is not bound to a 
past, immutable loss; instead, loss is mediated in a present pregnant with 
productive potential. Indeed, the invocation of the multiple and often 
intersecting forms of loss apparent in Certainty provides a site for the 
investigation of the productive potential of melancholia in movements 
of identity politics. David Eng points to the need to recognize the “very 
possibility of multiple states of injury” and the “intersecting subject 
positions” of gendered, queer, racialized, postcolonial, and diasporic 
melancholic subjects (“Melancholia” 1276). In Certainty, I recognize a 
movement toward not only the identification of intersubjective states of 
loss, but also the potential for the mobilization of such intersubjective 
griefs to forms of productive and collective “grievance.” Thien’s restruc-
turing of the temporality of loss opens up a space for the subjects of grief 
to shape and construct narratives of loss, as well as the potential for the 
ethical mobilization of past lost in present and future “grievances.”
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Notes
1 Cheng deploys the term “grievance” specifically for its association with an “implied 
logic of comparability and compensation” (6). In so doing, she draws on the term’s legal 
connotations in order to focus attention on what she recognizes as oft-overlooked sources 
of legal and political grievance. Her use of the term, then, articulates the transition of racial 
grief or injury to viable social claims (3). Throughout the remainder of this paper, I employ 
the term as Cheng defines it: as the process by which social injury — especially racial injury 
— can be mobilized to obtain political goals, to incite change, or to demand restitution. 
2 I agree with Cuder-Dominguez that Thien privileges the aural in Certainty; however, 
this privileging of the aural over the visual may appear to conflict with the negotiation of 
postmemory that I recognize at work in Thien’s text. Hirsch’s concept of postmemory is 
one that is explicated through photographs, specifically through Holocaust photographs 
and the graphic novel Maus. While Hirsch privileges the image in her analysis, she asserts 
that both “images and narratives . . . constitute [postmemory’s] instruments and [their] 
very medium, extending well into subsequent generations” (22). Hirsch, thus, leaves open 
the possibility of postmemory manifesting in narrative form. Whether textual or aural, 
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